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Mohair is an exclusive natural animal fibre with niche market appeal. It is, however, 
questionable whether it is inherently suited to a commodity-based marketing system in 
a marketing environment that requires marketing systems to convey far more 
information than commodity-based systems do. Historically, mohair has been 
considered a commodity and the marketing system for mohair has been structured 
accordingly. It is, however, argued that, the exchange between mohair growers and the 
buyers of greasy mohair requires increased levels of coordination to govern the 
exchange in a transaction costs efficient manner. The inefficiencies created by an 
inappropriate or incomplete marketing system for South African mohair are expected 
to lead to a loss of consumer value and a loss of potential profit throughout the mohair 
supply chain if a more coordinated governance structure is not implemented to curb 
these costs and augment the current spot market exchange. 
 




Mohair is the technical name for the fleece of the Angora goat and originates 
from an Arabian word meaning “best fleece”. Mohair is a unique and 
luxurious natural fibre and no other fibre, natural or man-made, has the same 
unique properties as mohair. Mohair is sought after for its comfort, it being 
warm in winter and cool in summer and for being highly durable. Mohair is 
also particularly valuable as a textile fibre because of its properties such as 
firmness, lustre, resilience, moisture absorption and low felting capacity. 
Mohair is processed via lengthy processes into textiles that are used to 
manufacture a number of final products. The demand for different types of 
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Table 1: Composition of the mohair clip and current application  
Type of hair  Application  Demand  % of clip 
Superfine and Fine 
Kid (< 26 micron) 
Wide application in men’s and 
ladies’ wear 
Extremely sought 
after but fashion 
dependent 
7.2 
Kid (26-28 micron) 
Finds application in men’s and 
ladies’ wear 
Sought after but 
fashion dependent 
10.8 
Fine Young Goat 
(28-30 micron) 
Used in men’s and ladies’ wear 
and in household upholstery 
Sought after when in 
fashion 
7.6 
Strong Young Goat 
(30-33 micron) 
Used in men’s and ladies’ wear 
and in household upholstery 





Used in men’s and ladies’ wear, 
household upholstery, knitting 
industry and brushed products 
(blankets etc.) 
Limited when 





Application only in brushed 
products, carpets and curtains. 
Alternative application limited. 
Limited 45.0 
Source: Van der Westhuysen (1991) and own contribution 
 
Spot market exchange, typical of commodity marketing systems, currently 
dominates as the primary mechanism of exchange for South African raw 
mohair. Mohair is considered a typical commodity with a number of classes 
and is traded on a spot market auction that publicly sets the price for mohair 
in South Africa. The purpose of this paper is to show that despite the 
commodity characteristics mohair can, under certain circumstances, perhaps 
obtain better marketing results through another governance system as shown 
by the Camdeboo case described in this paper. The successes achieved by the 
Camdeboo group are indicative that a greater level of coordination within the 
mohair supply chain can, in specific circumstances, potentially yield better 
results than the current commodity based mechanism of coordination alone. It 
is argued that the use of a spot market based marketing of mohair may not be 
conducive to the optimal flow of information, goods and returns throughout 
the supply chain since the communication of mutual wants and needs 
between producers and their clients is not easily facilitated by a spot market 
system (Loots, 2002).  
 
Spot markets are characteristically suited to the marketing of commodities and 
are generally associated with generic product promotion, uncoordinated 
exchange, players that seek self interest, limited information sharing, 
opportunism, short term relationships and a relatively small amount of 
attention that is afforded to product differentiation (Champion & Fearne, 
2001b). Trends in agribusiness systems are, however, increasingly moving 
away from the commodity approach to marketing to an approach that focuses 
on differentiated and branded products, coordinated exchange, players that 
seek mutual interest, open information sharing, long–term relationships and 
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the successful marketing of a product through satisfying the needs and wants 
of the customer more effectively than competitors (Champion & Fearne, 2001b; 
Kotler, 2000). Taking the changing marketing environment, the exclusivity and 
niche market appeal of mohair and the unique composition of the mohair clip 
into account, the question arises whether mohair is inherently suited to a 
commodity-based approach to marketing as facilitated by the spot market. 
This arises from the debate whether spot market coordination satisfies the 
basic fundamentals of marketing that require signals conveying far more 
information than price alone, as is necessary for differentiated product 
businesses systems.  
 
In this context this paper debates the proposition that the spot market is 
potentially not the most suitable platform to govern the exchange of mohair 
under all conditions, especially high quality mohair, between mohair 
producers and mohair processors. 
 
In debating this issue the paper is not positivistic in nature but has certain 
objectives that will be achieved through deductive processes. These processes 
are informed by a four year engagement with the industry and the 
development of a case study to provide evidence to substantiate the 
arguments that are made. The general objective of this paper is to analyse the 
structures governing the marketing of South African mohair and to debate the 
issues influencing the choice of a suitable structure to govern the marketing of 
South African mohair in the evolving agribusiness environment. Before 
debating the appropriate governance system for mohair it is necessary to 
review the history of mohair marketing in South Africa to provide the context 
for the debate. This is elaborated upon in Section 2. 
  
2.  Evolution of mohair marketing in South Africa 
 
Since the establishment of the mohair industry in South Africa in the early 
1800s the industry was characterised by periods that ranged from good 
fortune with high levels of demand, good prices, increased levels of 
production and continuous improvement of quality to turbulent periods 
characterised by adverse climatic conditions, economic recessions, low prices, 
outbreaks of disease, sudden changes in fashion and discord within the 
industry (Pringle & Döckel, 1989; Van der Westhuysen et al., 1988). 
 
The Department of Agriculture, mohair producers and mohair merchants 
realised that the continued existence of the mohair industry was dependent on 
the active promotion of the mohair industry. In 1951 an inspection fee was 
instituted by the government and collected by the agency of mohair merchants 
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to contribute to a public fund under the control of the Minister of Agriculture 
for, amongst others, the promotion of mohair. In order to assist him in the 
proper application of the fund the Minister appointed a Mohair Advisory 
Board. The Mohair Advisory Board was tasked, under the auspices of the 
Minister, with proposing and executing projects, research and promotions that 
it deemed beneficial to the South African mohair industry (Van der 
Westhuysen et al., 1988). The public auction disposal of mohair was already 
instituted in 1949 despite considerable resistance from mohair buyers and 
when the Mohair Advisory Board was established in 1951 it announced 
classing standards for mohair for the first time.  
 
In 1965 it became clear that the powers of the Mohair Advisory Board were 
insufficient and consequently a scheme for regulating the marketing of mohair 
under the Marketing Act (Act 26/1937) was announced in an extraordinary 
Government Gazette (1244/1965) which also made provision for the 
establishment of a Mohair Control Board. Mohair was still marketed by four 
brokers on auctions scheduled by the Mohair Advisory Board. At the time the 
Control Board did not interfere in the free flow of mohair to the market nor 
did it attempt to influence prices directly (Pringle & Döckel, 1989; Van der 
Westhuysen, 1993).  
 
An alarming decline in prices during 1970, however, prompted the executive 
of the South African Mohair Growers Association to approach the Mohair 
Control Board to investigate an alternative marketing system. In 1971, a 
proposal, despite considerable opposition from some producers and buyers, 
was accepted to stabilise mohair prices by means of a single channel pool 
scheme (Pringle & Döckel, 1989). From 1972 the Mohair Control Board was 
given the sole right to market and set prices for South African mohair (Mohair 
Board, 1971). For economic reasons the four brokers at the time amalgamated 
into one body to form Boeremakelaars (Koöperatief) Beperk (BKB). The 
mohair control board subsequently appointed BKB as the sole agent to 
undertake mohair preparation and handling on behalf of the Board. In the 
early 1990s the escalating cost of clip preparation by BKB and the poor 
economy of the mohair industry at the time led mohair producers at the 1992 
congress of the Mohair Growers’ Association to request that the Mohair 
Control Board cancel its agreement with BKB and take over the function of clip 
preparation itself in an attempt to reduce the marketing costs of mohair (Van 
der Westhuysen, 1993). 
 
Widespread agricultural marketing reform in the mid to late 1990’s led to the 
suspension of the Marketing Scheme for Mohair and the disbanding of the 
Mohair Board in 1997. The Mohair Board was replaced by Mohair South 
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Africa, an independent private sector organisation and responsibility of 
preparing the clip was transferred to BKB and the then newly formed Cape 
Mohair and Wool (CMW). The assets of the Mohair Board were transferred to 
the Mohair Trust with the objective of safeguarding the assets for future 
utilisation in the advancement of mohair. Following the marketing reforms in 
1997, the marketing of mohair once again took place in the free market and 
producers were free to choose the means of disposal for their mohair. Over 
and above the existing open cry auction farm gates sales, forward selling, 
contracts, electronic auctions and tenders all emerged as possible trading 
platforms for exchanging mohair between mohair growers and buyers.  
 
Table 2 below details the primary trading platforms for mohair producers 
from 1998 to 2002 following a questionnaire survey amongst mohair 
producers.  
 
Table 2: Volumes (%) and values (%) of mohair per trading platform (1998-
2002) 
Year  Trading platform  Volumes by mass 
and value  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Mass  (%)  98 99 97 92 94 
Auction 
Value  (%)  98 99 96 86 88 
Mass  (%)  2 1 3 2 3 
Farm gate sales 
Value  (%)  2 1 4 4 6 
Mass  (%)  - - - 6 - 
Contracts 
Value  (%)  -  -  - 10 - 
Mass  (%)  - - - - 3 
Forward selling 
Value  (%)  - - - - 6 
Source: Own survey, 2003 (n=44) 
 
In light of the fact that controlled marketing of mohair was abolished during 
1997 a number of alternative trading arrangements started to emerge in the 
following years. These include farm gate sales, contracts and forward selling. 
Of these the open cry auction system was identified as the main trading 
platform with an average of 96% of the total volume of mohair of the 
respondents passing through the auction. Over time there has, however, been 
a general decline in the volume and value of the mohair passing through the 
auction with trading options like farm gate sales, contracts and forward selling 
e m e r g i n g  a s  t r a d i n g  o p t i o n s .  I t  i s  noteworthy that contracts and forward 
selling become avenues of trade during 2001 and 2002 but were not fixed 
arrangements with none of the producers reporting sales through contracts in 
2002 or sales through forward selling in 2001. This trend is in all likelihood 
ascribable to changing demand and supply conditions and mohair producers’ 
and buyers’ different strategies to minimise their risk under the different 
supply and demand conditions. 
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It is of specific importance to note that the decline in the value of mohair 
passing through the auction is significantly more than the decline in the 
volume of mohair passing through the auction. This leads to the conclusion 
that the higher value (better quality) mohair was increasingly passing through 
trading platforms other than the open cry auction during the specific period. 
 
3.  A framework for exploring alternative supply chain governance 
structures  
 
Jordaan (2005) debated at considerable length the different cases for mohair’s 
“unit type”, i.e. whether mohair is a product or a commodity. The markets for 
products containing mohair varies from home industries that offer craft 
products to exclusive boutiques that offer custom tailored products like 
exclusive men’s and ladies’ apparel and designer furniture. As a result of the 
diverse application of mohair the demand characteristics for the various types 
of mohair and mohair products and the competition for the respective 
products are also quite diverse as illustrated by Table 1 discussed earlier and 
Figure 1 below. From this it is evident that different types of mohair have 
quite different applications and demand characteristics. Relating the end-uses 
and demand characteristics of the diverse mohair clip to mohair’s unit type it 
is argued that, based on the properties of mohair clip, mohair can be termed a 
“product” since its diversity is translated into varied end-uses and variable 









































































































































































































Mohair fibre diameter in microns 
Figure 1: The markets and end-uses of mohair  
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Making an argument that under specific circumstances mohair potentially 
exhibits characteristics of a uniquely defined product a next step is to explore 
additional governance structures for the marketing of mohair that can convey 
more information than price and basic quality. Potentially the mohair 
industry, or individual firms within the industry, must make a strategic 
decision regarding the optimal vertical coordination strategy for each vertical 
exchange relationship that is executed in the process of doing business. Such a 
decision needs to be informed by considering all possible options along the 
vertical coordination continuum (Peterson et al., 2001) from spot markets to 
fully vertically integrated systems. To a large extent this decision is informed 
by (1) the nature of the product/commodity (discussed above and also in 
Jordaan, 2005), (2) transaction costs in exchange and, related to that, (3) the 
asset specificity for each of the agents in the chain. These issues are discussed 
below. 
 
3.1  Transaction costs and vertical coordination 
 
Hobbs (1996) notes that transaction costs always play an important role in any 
supply chain since they affect the type of coordination between successive 
stages of economic activity or “vertical coordination”. Vertical coordination is 
generally defined as “……all the ways of harmonising the successive vertical 
stages of production and marketing” or “the alignment of direction and 
control across segments of a production/marketing system” (Mighell & Jones, 
1963; King, 1992). Sporleder (1992) points out that the factors aligned in 
vertical coordination are price, quantity, quality and terms of exchange.  
 
The idea of a vertical coordination continuum has developed over time 
starting with the classic “Make vs. Buy” decision that identifies two possible 
vertical coordination strategies - a spot market and vertical integration. Over 
time the number of possible coordination strategies has increased and a 
number of hybrid coordination strategies between spot markets and vertical 
coordination (e.g. joint planning and information sharing, specification 
contracts and equity arrangements) were identified. The various individual 
components of the vertical coordination continuum have been analysed by a 
number of authors but only recently has it been defined as a true continuum. 
The research of Peterson et al. (2001) proposes that the various discrete vertical 
coordination strategies that have developed over time can be viewed as a 
continuum stretching from open markets on the one extreme to complete 
vertical integration (multiple successive economic stages under single 
ownership) on the other extreme with a number of hybrid coordination 
strategies in between these two extremes (Peterson et al., 2001). Peterson et al. 
(2001) propose a continuum with five major categories of vertical coordination 
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strategies that run from open spot markets to complete vertical integration. At 
the spot market end of the continuum, the “invisible-hand” of economics 
governs the exchange between parties where individual economic actors 
pursue their own interests, enter into exchange relationships that are short-
term and opportunistic, have limited sharing of information, and are flexible 
and preserving of the parties’ independence. At the other end of the vertical 
coordination continuum mutual interest governs the exchange between parties 
where economic actors pursue mutual benefits and enter into long term 
relationships characterised by stability, interdependence and the sharing of 
benefits information. 
 
A number of factors potentially determine the nature of vertical coordination 
between successive economic activities (Hobbs, 1996; Martinez, 2002). 
Transaction costs are one of these potential determinants of vertical 
coordination. Although the other determinants of coordination are by no 
means insignificant this inquiry focuses on the interaction between transaction 
costs and vertical integration and the ultimate effect on the marketing of South 
African mohair. According to transaction costs economics, the nature and level 
of transaction costs and the characteristics of the transaction determine the 
nature of vertical coordination and firms choose a method of vertical 
coordination based on a comparison of the net effect on transaction costs 
(Hobbs, 1996; Martinez, 2002). Ménard (2004) proposes that, based on the 
discrete alignment principle developed by Williamson (1991), specific 
transactional relationships are selected through efforts made by transacting 
parties to reduce the cost of the transaction by aligning the governance 
structure with the exchange attributes. 
 
Mahoney (1992) provides the most extensive framework to specify 
coordination mechanisms, and he uses three conditions that need 
consideration when deciding on a coordination strategy, namely separability, 
asset specificity and the degree of uncertainty (programmability). 
 
Champion and Fearne (2001a) define these conditions as follows:  
 
•  Separability. This refers to the ability to determine and measure the value 
of the contribution and hence reward for each player in the transaction. 
If it is easy to measure value creation at each stage of the chain, the 
transactions are said to be separable. 
•  Asset specificity or uniqueness. This refers to the specialised nature of the 
human or physical assets that are required to complete the transaction. 
The more unique or specialised the asset, the stronger the inter-firm 
bond required to encourage investment. Peterson et al. (2001) define 
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asset specificity as the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to 
alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive 
value. Unlike general-purpose assets that can be freely transferred 
across applications, transaction specific assets are tailored to a particular 
user (transaction) and thus maintain their value only in a narrow range 
of alternative uses.  
•  Task programmability. This indicates that a transaction is well understood 
by all parties and is often repeated and has predictable outcomes, 
without the need for discussions or negotiation. 
 
The extensive framework developed by Mahoney (1992) to guide the choice of 
vertical coordination strategy based on asset specificity, task programmability 
and separability is presented in Table 3 below and is then used in the section 
to follow to discuss potential vertical coordination mechanisms for South 
African mohair producers and mohair buyers 
 
Table 3: The vertical coordination continuum 
Low programmability  High programmability 
  Low asset 
specificity 








Cooperation or vertical 
ownership 
Inside contract 
Source: Mahoney, 1992 
 




Williamson (1996) identifies a variety of forms of asset specificity that include 
physical, human, site, and dedicated brand name asset specificity. When the 
first transacting relationship in the mohair supply chain (the transaction 
between mohair growers and mohair buyers) is considered and viewed in 
terms of asset specificity it is argued that this relationship is characterised by 




Mohair producers, as the first party to the transaction, invest in a number of 
specialised assets in order to be able to transact with first stage mohair 
processors (via mohair buyers), the second party to the transaction. These 
specialised assets are:  
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Angora goats  
 
Angora goats are kept solely for producing mohair and only in unusual 
circumstances, like when animals become unproductive or during prolonged 
periods of very depressed prices and consequent herd reductions are Angora 
goats slaughtered for chevron. Since the Angora goat is a very inefficient 
producer of meat, an Angora goat’s use as an asset for mohair producers is 
therefore limited to the production of mohair. Angora goats can therefore be 
viewed as highly specialised and very specific physical assets that mohair 
producers invest in, in order to be able to transact with mohair buyers. The 
level of investment in Angora goats as specific assets for South African mohair 
producers is evident from the contribution that mohair production makes to 
the total farm income of mohair producers. Following from a survey amongst 
mohair producers it was determined that about 44% of South African mohair 
producers earn at least half of their total income from producing mohair. 
Therefore at least 44% of South African mohair producers’ bulk total farm 
income (>  50% contribution to total farm income) is dependant on the 
investment in Angora goats. 
 
It is, however, noted that livestock is generally considered as a liquid asset 
which diminishes livestock’s degree of asset specificity. The liquidity of 
Angora goats as an asset is, however, not as high as that of general stock since 
it takes time to breed and build a flock of Angora goats that can produce good 
quality mohair. This implies that when a farmer makes the decision to produce 
mohair it is a specific and longer-term investment in mohair production both 
in terms of the specific breed of animals as well as the time it will take to breed 
and compose a flock that consistently produces high quality mohair. The 
investment in time that is required to breed and compose a flock that 
consistently produces high quality mohair, alone, is therefore sufficient 
incentive against continuous buying and selling of a producer’s whole herd 
over short periods of time and proof that Angora goats are, although livestock, 
not highly liquid assets. 
 
Investment in specific genetic material is another highly specific asset that 
mohair producers invest in. The production of mohair, especially good quality 
mohair, is heavily dependant on investment in very specific high quality 
genetic material that has the capacity to influence the fineness, the style and 
character and to some extent the length of the mohair, all of which are 
economically important attributes of mohair. 
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Shearing facilities  
 
Shearing facilities are used to shear fibre from animals, generally wool from 
sheep and mohair from goats. Shearing facilities generally constitute herding 
pens, a building of some sort, in many instances a shearing machine, sorting 
tables and bins for the various classes of wool or mohair, implying that 
considerable investment needs to be made when investing in shearing 
facilities. Shearing facilities can also be considered as relatively specific assets 
for which there are relatively limited alternative uses. The only alternative use 
for a mohair producer’s shearing facilities is for the shearing of wool 
producing sheep, if the mohair producer is also a wool producer. Given the 
nature of the mohair producing area in South Africa many mohair producers 
may well be wool producers and therefore shearing facilities are shared 
between wool and mohair. Since shearing facilities have an alternative use the 
degree of asset specificity of shearing facilities will depend on the contribution 
of mohair production to the farming business. The greater mohair 
production’s contribution is to the farming business the greater the asset 




Farmland on the basis of site specificity can also be considered as a relatively 
specific asset that mohair producers invest in, in order to be able to transact 
with mohair buyers. The Eastern Cape Province, as noted earlier, is the 
premier mohair producing area in South Africa and has the most suitable 
farmland for Angora farming. The suitability of the Eastern Cape for the 
production of mohair can be ascribed to the historical establishment of on-
farm infrastructure (shelter, shearing sheds, kraals, dipping facilities, fencing, 
etc) for the production of fibre producing animals (wool producing sheep and 
mohair producing goats), shrub vegetation that is well suited to the browsing 
requirements of goats and a predominantly healthy climate relatively free of 
serious small stock diseases found in other areas of South Africa. The area over 
which mohair production is spread is quite diverse and a number of farming 
activities are undertaken in this area. Our survey conducted amongst mohair 
producers, revealed that the most significant other farming activities that 
mohair producers undertake, depending on the area, include the production 
of wool, mutton, beef, and to a lesser extent game, Boer goats, ostriches and 
crops. Farmland in the primary mohair producing areas of South Africa is 
therefore most suited to the production of stock, especially small stock, which 
includes mohair. When a producer therefore acquires land in this area he is 
investing in an asset that is generally very specific to the production of small 
stock. Although farmland is not a highly specific investment for mohair 
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producers since the land can readily be used for a number of alternative uses, 
the fact remains that these uses are limited and that the land is ideal and 
useful for producing mohair. 
 
Specialised human capital 
 
Mohair producers also have to invest in “specialised human capital” in terms 
of informing/educating themselves about the production and handling of 
mohair. The production of quality mohair is primarily dependent on the 
genetic quality of the Angora goats, environmental conditions and the 
management of the herd. Since the management of the herd is an important 
factor determining the success of mohair production, mohair producers have 
to invest time to acquire specialised skills to produce mohair successfully. 
These skills include progressive animal husbandry, breeding, herd 
management, nutrition, shearing, clip preparation and classing and sorting 
practises as they relate to the rearing of Angora goats and the production of 
mohair. These specialised skills to successfully produce mohair should also be 




Processing equipment  
 
To enable processors to transact with mohair producers they have to invest in 
specialised physical assets in the form of machinery and/or equipment. The 
equipment that is used to process mohair is in essence equipment that is 
designed to process wool but as a result of the distinct differences in the 
processing characteristics of wool and mohair it is necessary to adapt the 
equipment to be able to process mohair. The differences in the processing of 
mohair and wool are such that the adaptation required to process mohair 
renders the equipment unsuitable for the processing of wool. Processing 
equipment can therefore be considered as an investment in specific assets for 
mohair processors. 
 
Location (Site specificity) 
 
First stage mohair processors have to locate their facilities relatively close to 
the primary mohair producing area to reduce transportation costs to the 
processing plant. By locating facilities on a specific site and because relocation 
costs are high the first stage mohair processors and mohair producers become 
locked in an exchange relationship for at least the useful life of the processing 
plant. 
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Specialised human capital  
 
As noted previously mohair is a unique fibre and requires relatively 
specialised human capital to process. Consequently mohair processors have to 
employ people that have acquired the necessary skills and knowledge to 
process mohair. Furthermore processors also need to invest in the continued 
learning of their employees so as to improve their capacity in processing 
mohair. 
  
3.3 Task  programmability 
 
When the transacting relationship between mohair growers and mohair 
buyers is considered and viewed in terms of task programmability it can be 
concluded that this relationship is characterised by relatively low levels of 
programmability. Mohair production is clearly a biological process and the 
relative quantity and quality of mohair that is produced is heavily dependant 
on environmental conditions – a factor over which producers have no control. 
Although producers can manipulate the quality of the mohair that they 
produce through breeding and husbandry practices, it remains difficult to 
programme the final quality and quantity of mohair that is produced. 
 
As a result of the variable nature of mohair production the processing of 
mohair is also characterised by relatively low levels of programmability. The 
total annual production of mohair generally does not vary significantly from 
year to year and therefore has little influence on processors’ programmability 
– annual production is largely subject to predictable mega trends. There are, 
however, two significant sources of uncertainty that reduce programmability 
for mohair buyers/processors on the input side of their operations. The first is 
the varying quantity of the different quality classes of mohair, since 
production is subject to environmental conditions that have a direct influence 
on the quality of mohair produced. The other factor that reduces 
programmability for mohair processors is the timing of the delivery of mohair 
by producers. Given the relatively small size of the South African mohair clip 
in global terms (it constitutes a mere 0.007% of the annual global consumption 
of all textile fibres) it is conceivable that the timing decision of producers to 
deliver their clip and offer them for sale could influence processors 
programmability (Jordaan, 2005). If processors are looking for a specific 
quantity and quality of mohair at a specific time to be able to fulfil an order 
but the raw mohair that they require isn’t available for sale on the auction it 
detrimentally affects their programmability. 
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In short, the arguments presented in this section point to the fact that both 
mohair producers and mohair processors (via mohair buyers) are subject to 
relatively low levels of programmability when transacting with each other. 
Although the intensity of the programmability of the various processes is 
relative, as discussed, the exchange relationship between mohair producers 
and mohair processors can generally be seen as a relationship characterised by 




The transactions between mohair growers and buyers is characterised by 
mixed levels of separability. Separability refers to the ability to determine and 
measure the value of the contribution and hence reward for each player in the 
transaction. Non-separability, also known as complementarity, exists when the 
combination of individual activities within a transaction yields an output 
larger than the sum of outputs generated by individual activities.  
 
When bringing separability and/or complementarity into relation with the 
exchange relationship between mohair producers and mohair processors, two 
views can be taken. The first view is that the value of the contribution of each 
of the role players in the mohair supply chain is clearly discernable and 
relatively easy to determine. Mohair producers contribute to the mohair 
supply chain by producing mohair and they are rewarded for performing this 
function through the market related prices they receive for their mohair. 
Mohair buyers/processors contribute to the mohair supply chain by 
processing mohair from raw fibre into various intermediate levels of mohair 
like mohair tops or mohair yarns. They are rewarded for performing this 
function through the market related prices that they receive for their products.  
 
The second view is that where specific attributes of mohair, which are 
introduced at producer level, must be transferred through the chain to the 
final consumer the relationships between actors in the chain are not 
characterised by high levels of separability. To illustrate this, retailers and 
manufacturers of mohair products can, by themselves, not assure specific 
attributes introduced at producer level unless they coordinate production, 
processing, manufacturing etc. through the mohair supply chain in such a way 
that there is certainty that the specific attributes are in fact present and 
preserved throughout the chain. By their actions alone, manufacturers and 
retailers cannot assure what the end consumer wants. Only through controlled 
coordination with the producers and processors can the supply chain produce 
the desired end product (whether each role player gets adequately rewarded 
for the value that is added is another matter) and therefore it can also be 
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argued that the exchange between mohair producers and mohair processors 




Based on the Mahoney (1992) framework the exchange relationship between 
mohair producers and mohair processors (via mohair buyers) is characterised 
by investment in specific assets by both parties, low levels of programmability 
for both parties and mixed levels of separability between the tasks and 
rewards of both parties. The framework as proposed by Mahoney (1992) 
therefore dictates that for optimal and sustainable returns for both parties the 
relationship between mohair producers and mohair processors should be 
governed by either long term contracts, cooperation agreements or some form 
of vertical ownership. Under circumstances where high levels of separability 
can be identified contracts are more relevant and cooperation agreements and 
vertical ownership become more relevant where low levels of separability are 
identified. 
 
4.  Identifying alternative governance structures for the South African 
mohair supply chain 
 
As noted earlier the vertical coordination mechanism that currently dominates 
the exchange between mohair producers and mohair buyers is a spot market 
in the form of a public open cry auction. An obvious dichotomy is evident 
between what a suitable governance structure for the exchange relationship 
b e t w e e n  m o h a i r  p r o d u c e r s  a n d  m o h a i r  b u y e r s  o u g h t  t o  b e  ( b a s e d  o n  a  
theoretical derivation) and the governance structure currently in use (based on 
a practical derivation). To further analyse this dichotomy this enquiry makes 
use of the framework developed by Peterson et al. (2001) for choosing an 
appropriate vertical coordination strategy. 
  
The framework proposed by Peterson et al. (2001) is based on the logical choice 
that firms need to make regarding their positioning along the vertical 
coordination continuum for each vertical exchange relationship that the firm 
must enter into to be able to conduct business. The framework focuses on the 
analysis that decision makers would make to arrive at a specific coordination 
strategy to govern a specific exchange relationship. Peterson et al. (2001) 
postulate that decision makers will arrive at a specific vertical coordination 
strategy by asking themselves five interrelated questions that form the basis of 
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Figure 2: A decision-making framework for changing vertical coordination 
strategies  
Source: Peterson et al. (2001) 
 
4.1 Spot  market  exchange 
 
Wysocki et al. (2003) developed a methodology to quantitatively analyse firms’ 
strategic choice along the vertical coordination continuum, but as a result of 
the complexity and lack of relevant quantifiable data for the whole South 
African mohair industry the application of this framework for determining the 
most appropriate governance structure for the exchange between mohair 
producers and mohair processors follows a distinctly qualitative approach. A 
qualitative discussion of this framework for the exchange relationship between 
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producers and processors will, however, aid in gaining insight into the 
appropriateness of the current dominant vertical coordination strategy for 
South African mohair and the vertical coordination strategy as suggested by 
the Mahoney (1992) framework. This discussion is based on the five inter-
related questions proposed by the Peterson et al. (2001) decision framework: 
 
Question 1 - Is the current marketing system too “costly”? 
 
The first question initiates the process of determining the most appropriate 
vertical coordination strategy for a specific transactional relationship. The 
question is whether the cost of the current marketing system is too high in 
relation to a particular transaction or transactional relationship?  
 
It is argued that a mismatch can potentially occur in the current marketing 
system for mohair, resulting in costly coordination errors. Costly coordination 
errors either occur as a result of a marketing system’s inability to exploit or 
develop the non-material aspects of mohair since a commodity marketing 
system because it does not allow the efficient communication of unique 
product attributes OR because the marketing system creates more operating 
costs than the cost reduction in coordination errors it is designed to control. 
Based on earlier arguments that the South African mohair clip can be 
considered as a product (or rather a collection of “products”) and not a 
homogenous commodity the costly coordination error that results by using a 
spot market coordination in the form of a open cry auction sprouts from the 
inability of the current spot market to exploit attributes of mohair for which 
apparent opportunities exist as a result of the system’s inability to efficiently 
communicate the said attributes. These attributes may include attributes that 
are beyond the current classification or description parameters for mohair and 
which could include mohair produced according to a recognised and specific 
value system, mohair that is certifiable as organically produced, mohair that is 
classed to have a low coefficient of variation with respect to fibre diameter, 
mohair with superior fibre strength attributes etc. Because the open cry 
auction is currently the primary, but not the only means of coordinating the 
exchange between mohair producers and mohair processors (via mohair 
buyers), the shortcomings of the spot market coordination are highlighted by 
the fact that the higher value (better quality) mohair is increasingly passing 
through trading platforms other than the current dominant spot market 
system. This would imply that the open cry auction system, which focuses on 
generic attributes and commodity based business systems, is probably not 
creating optimal returns for mohair producers under all circumstances since it 
is not suited to communication properties of mohair beyond the price based 
on the basic classification system for mohair. 
  274 Agrekon, Vol 47, No 2 (June 2008)    Jordaan & Kirsten 
 
Question 2 – Would an alternative strategy reduce the “costliness” of the marketing 
system? 
 
This question requires an analysis of whether or not another vertical 
coordination strategy would better match the intensity and cost of 
coordination with the costliness of coordination errors for the specific 
transaction.  
 
Arguments were proffered that the level of asset specificity and non-
separability (or complementarity) between mohair producers and mohair 
buyers is characterised by relatively high levels of asset specificity and mixed 
levels of non-separability. This assessment of these two determining criteria 
imply that the costliness of the coordination errors, as noted previously, are 
potentially greater than the operating costs of the open cry auction spot 
market that currently dominates the exchange between producers and buyers. 
Since the cost of the coordination errors between producers and buyers are 
potentially greater than the cost of operating the governance structure greater 
intensity in the control of the exchange becomes necessary. Greater intensity in 
control constitutes a move to the right along the vertical coordination 
continuum where the governance structure could possibly better control the 
coordination errors without negating these benefits through higher operating 
costs. Yet, due to a lack of data there is no certainty of the impact of contracts 
or other forms of increased coordination. 
 
In terms of determining whether an alternative coordination strategy would 
reduce the “costliness” of the current marketing system for South African 
mohair, the answer is potentially a “Yes”. A coordination strategy that 
exercises greater control intensity could potentially reduce the “costliness” of 
the current marketing system for South African mohair. As deduced from the 
Mahoney (1992) framework earlier, contracts or cooperation agreements or 
some kind of vertical ownership match the criteria for increased intensity of 
control and are potentially “better” coordination strategies to govern the 
exchange between mohair producers and buyers.  
 
Question 3 – Is an alternative programmable? 
 
If another vertical coordination strategy offers a potentially better match 
between costliness of coordination errors and coordination control intensity, 
then the framework leads to a third question in the strategy change process: Is 
the potential alternative programmable?  
 
As mentioned mohair production is relatively fragmented with an estimated 
1 200 to 1 500 producers producing South Africa’s total mohair clip. Mohair 
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processors who are the sole consumers of raw mohair are, conversely highly 
concentrated with only a few primary mohair processors globally. The 
imbalance between the number of mohair producers and processors results in 
a number of problems for both parties if they were to directly transact with 
each other. Mohair producers would face the “small-number” bargaining 
problem and coupled with specialised assets, small number bargaining 
increases the potential for opportunistic behaviour because alternative 
exchanges cannot be easily arranged. Mohair processors on the other hand 
would incur high transaction costs (search, negotiation and monitoring costs) 
if they have to transact with so many relatively small producers. Brokers have 
over the years become the intermediary institution between producers and 
processors to help both parties overcome these high transaction costs. As 
noted, brokers facilitate the open cry auction where mohair producers offer 
mohair for sale to mohair processors (via mohair buyers) and can therefore be 
considered as an integral component of the transaction between producers and 
buyers. “Producer organisations”, which are beginning to form in the mohair 
industry can potentially, also fulfil a similar role as brokers by acting as 
intermediary between producers and processors. 
 
When the programmability of the alternative coordination strategies to govern 
the exchange between mohair producers and processors is considered it is 
evident that an intermediary remains integral to successfully facilitating the 
process. The presence of an intermediary like a broker (Cape Mohair and 
Wool, BKB) or producer group (Camdeboo) makes contracting in particular, a 
programmable alternative coordination strategy. Cooperation and even forms 
of vertical integration are programmable and effective, specific management 
routines could be but in place to make any of these potential strategies 
workable. 
 
Question 4 – Is an alternative implementable? 
 
Programmability only assures that specific management routines exist. It does 
not ensure that a specific decision maker, like the mohair industry, can 
effectively implement the routines. Implementability can be conceived as 
arising from four conditions (Peterson et al., 2001). 
 
Capital availability:  
Existence of compatible partners:  
Control competence:  
Institutional acceptability:  
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If the alternative vertical coordination strategies that are proposed for the 
exchange between mohair producers and processor (via buyers) by the 
Mahoney (1992) framework are considered in terms of implementability a 
number of remarks can be made. 
 
The capital outlay that would typically be required to implement contracting 
and/or cooperation between mohair producers and mohair buyers via  the 
various intermediaries would be very limited. The basic infrastructure to 
facilitate any of these vertical coordination strategies is already in place and a 
mere re-alignment and/or restructuring would be the only “investment” 
required in terms of infrastructure. Investment in the drawing up of legal 
contracts and/or terms of exchange would be the other capital outlay required 
from the parties (producers, brokers, producer groups, buyers, processors) at 
this exchange point to make any of these proposed vertical coordination 
strategies implementable. None of the abovementioned capital outlays are 
envisaged to be of sufficient size to hinder the implementability of these 
vertical coordination strategies. These capital outlays could actually be 
considered an investment in the future for the exchange parties since these 
means of exchanging are increasingly characterising these types of exchanges 
globally. 
 
The existence of compatible partners amongst parties at this point of exchange 
in the mohair supply chain is not clearly identifiable since this would require 
an in-depth analysis of each of the parties, their current strategic direction and 
corporate culture. It is, however, very likely that compatible partners at this 
exchange point in the chain will exist and that the proposed vertical 
coordination strategies will indeed be implementable.  
 
In terms of control competence many producers are comfortable with an 
auction market because they view themselves as having the “trading” skills 
relevant to spot transactions. Few producers, however, have sufficient 
experience or are willing, as individuals, to engage in the levels of control 
needed for the increased levels of coordination required by governance 
structures, such as specification contracts or alliances. Brokers or producer 
groups that act as intermediaries between individual producers and mohair 
processors, however, offer an institutional framework that has the necessary 
control competence required to exercise the coordination control required by 
governance structures such as specification contracts or alliances. In order for 
vertical coordination strategies that require increased levels of coordination, as 
are proposed, to be implementable, an intermediary like a broker or producer 
group becomes desirable to provide the necessary coordination control 
competency and institutional structure.  
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The last requirement to evaluate the implementability of the proposed vertical 
coordination strategies is the institutional acceptability. A “well structured” 
industry like the South African mohair industry would only structure the 
exchanges between parties within legally acceptability norms. The broader 
institutional acceptability of the proposed alternative vertical coordination 
strategies for the primary marketing of South African mohair poses the 
greatest threat to the implementability of the these strategies. The exchange 
between mohair producers and processors as facilitated by the various 
intermediaries (brokers and buyers) has developed over many decades and a 
number of conventions regarding this exchange relationship are deeply 
rooted. From observation, the social, cultural and group norms established at 
this exchange in the mohair industry are such that there are relatively low 
levels of cooperation; “change” from the status quo is generally unwelcome (or 
even undermined) and the implementation of strategies are delayed by 
industry politics and overly bureaucratic decision making processes. These 
deeply rooted norms within the South African mohair industry, although not 
insurmountable, may influence the institutional acceptability of the proposed 
alternative vertical coordination strategies.  
 
An overall assessment of the four conditions for implementability of the 
proposed alternative coordination strategies between mohair producers and 
mohair processors via the relevant intermediaries reveals that the alternatives 
are implementable. The implementability of these alternatives is anticipated to 
be without hindrance from lack of capital, a lack of suitable partners, or a lack 
of control competence. The only possible hindrance to the implementability is 
the institutional acceptability of these alternatives based on the social, cultural 
and group norms present within the South African mohair industry.  
 
Question 5 – Is the risk/return trade-off acceptable? 
 
Based on the “extra value” that could be extracted through the reduction or 
control of costly coordination errors through more coordinated exchange 
between mohair producers and processors (via brokers, producer group’s and 
buyers) it must be concluded that the risk/return trade-off of the alternative 
strategies is acceptable. The risks associated with adopting the proposed 
alternative coordination strategies are relatively low, especially since these 
strategies could in all likelihood be offered as “alternative” exchange 
mechanisms to compliment existing exchange mechanisms resulting in very 
little risk in implementing these alternative strategies. 
 
The Peterson et al. (2001) framework proposes that only a “yes” answer to all 
five of the relevant strategic questions will result in a changed coordination 
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strategy for the particular transaction in question. By means of qualitative 
analysis and deduction all five relevant questions of the Peterson et al. (2001) 
framework have been answered with a “Yes” answer for contracts or 
cooperation agreements (as determined by the Mahoney framework). This 
result implies that contracts or cooperation agreements are viable alternatives 
to the current open cry auction spot market that prevails as the primary means 
of coordinating the exchange between South African mohair producers and 
mohair processors based on the relevant frameworks used to arrive at these 
conclusions.  
 
  The makings of alternative or additional coordination arrangements for 
marketing mohair in South Africa 
 
O’Keeffe (1998) notes that the income for individual members of a supply 
chain stems from the variable division of value between members in the chain. 
The continued existence of a supply chain is therefore dependent on an 
equitable distribution of the value created in the supply chain so that each 
member in the supply chain is able to remain in business and have sufficient 
incentive to maintain the necessary level of quality throughout the chain. One 
of the primary challenges for the South African mohair marketing system is to 
ensure that equitable portions of the value created in the mohair supply chain 
are allocated to producers to keep them in business and to provide them with 
the necessary incentives to produce high quality raw mohair that can 
eventually be transformed into high quality final products.  
 
A marketing system for South African mohair is one that would capture and 
transmit all the tangible and intangible attributes of mohair through the entire 
supply chain. The attributes that require communication may include mohair 
produced according to a recognised and specific value system, mohair that is 
certifiable as organically produced, mohair that is classed to have a low 
coefficient of variation with respect to fibre diameter, mohair with superior 
fibre strength attributes etc. all of which are currently not described or 
captured within the current classification system for mohair but of potential 
value to role players further along the supply chain. Creating a marketing 
system with this capacity requires vertical coordination strategies that can 
effectively and efficiently transmit these product attributes through the supply 
chain from the exchange between producers and processors to the exchange 
between retailers and consumers. If one exchange relationship in the 
marketing chain is not capable of transmitting these attributes effectively a 
“value bottleneck” is created at that exchange and the value that cannot be 
transmitted by the governance structure is lost. The result is a reduction in the 
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total value created in the chain and reduced value to be distributed amongst 
the supply chain role players.  
 
This paper has investigated the exchange relationship between mohair 
producers and processors and aspects surrounding an appropriate vertical 
coordination strategy to govern this exchange within the current agribusiness 
environment and the mohair supply chain as a whole. The proposition made 
thus far is that mohair can generally be regarded as a product with both 
tangible and intangible attributes and that the current spot market that 
governs the exchange between producers and processors can allow costly 
coordination errors to occur and value to be lost since the spot market does not 
allow the effective and efficient communication of all of the economically 
valuable attributes of mohair. O’Keeffe (1998) and Champion and Fearne 
(2000) also argue that spot markets separate producers from processors which 
limits communication between these exchanging parties and creates 
difficulties in effectively transmitting both the “hard” and “soft” attributes of 
the product being exchanged. These authors therefore consider spot markets 
as “value bottlenecks” in instances where the spot market is required, but is 
unable to transmit attributes of the product that would create greater 
collective value in the supply chain.  
 
The exchange between mohair producers and processors should therefore 
theoretically be governed by vertical coordination strategies that can 
effectively and efficiently transmit the tangible and intangible attributes that 
mohair is  arg ue d t o possess. It is therefore proposed that the spot market, 
which is contended to be a “value bottleneck” under circumstances where it is 
required to transmit more attributes that price and basic classes in the mohair 
supply chain, be augmented by more intensively coordinated governance 
structures like long term contracts, cooperation agreements or some form of 
vertical ownership to offer the necessary structures to transmit attributes like 
mohair produced according to a recognised and specific value system, mohair 
that is certifiable as organically produced, mohair that is classed to have a low 
coefficient of variation with respect to fibre diameter, mohair with superior 
fibre strength attributes etc more effectively between producers and 
processors and ultimately the whole mohair supply chain. Boehlje (1999) 
assents to this proposal by pointing out that that various forms of negotiated 
coordination systems become more effective and necessary for efficient 
functioning of the production and distribution system in the current 
agribusiness environment. 
 
Marketing systems where the exchanges between supply chain members are 
predominantly governed by governance structures that require intermediate 
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levels of coordination control, like long term contracts or cooperation 
agreements, also create the opportunity for greater cooperation amongst chain 
members. Champion and Fearne (2001b) propose that a supply chain 
management (SCM) approach to the marketing of wool would create greater 
value in the supply chain and foster an environment where supply chain 
members cooperate and share the value created in the supply chain equitably - 
a “win-win” situation for the whole supply chain. These authors consider 
SCM as “an overarching philosophy” for an entire marketing system which 
creates value by allowing effective communication and the transmission of 
“hard” and “soft” product characteristics from raw material to the consumer. 
A marketing system for South African mohair that embraces more intensively 
coordinated governance structures like long term contracts, cooperation 
agreements or some form of vertical ownership is also suited to a supply chain 
management approach like Champion and Fearne (2000) describe.  
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
This paper reviewed the possible marketing governance structures that could 
govern the exchange between mohair producers and processors as facilitated 
by the relevant intermediaries. The theoretical frameworks proposed by 
Mahoney (1992) and Peterson et al. (2001) were used as a guide to propose 
suitable vertical coordination strategies between mohair producers and 
processors. These frameworks reveal that, as a result of mohair’s attributes, the 
nature of the assets necessary to produce and process mohair and the nature of 
the transaction between the parties, the exchange between mohair producers 
and processors could potentially be governed by some form of contracting or 
cooperation between the transacting parties. Mohair is argued to be a product 
with both tangible and intangible attributes and; that the current spot market 
that governs the exchange between producers and processors potentially 
allows costly coordination errors to occur and value to be lost since the spot 
market exchange is not well suited to the effective and efficient 
communication of an array of diverse attributes beyond price and basic 
quality. 
 
Under circumstances where it is not necessary to convey more than 
information than price and basic quality the spot market remains an effective 
and efficient mechanism to exchange mohair. However, the spot market, 
which is potentially a “value bottleneck” in specific circumstances, should be 
augmented by more intensively coordinated governance structures like long 
term contracts, cooperative agreements or some form of vertical ownership to 
offer the necessary structures to transmit attributes other than price and basic 
quality more effectively between producers and processors and ultimately the 
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whole mohair supply chain for mohair that demonstrates these qualities when 
circumstances call for this. 
 
Therefore, the proposition that spot market coordination is not the most 
suitable platform to govern the exchange of mohair between mohair producers 
and mohair processors under all circumstances is proven to be true based on 
the arguments in this paper which illustrate that alternative coordination 
mechanisms can be considered to govern the exchange between mohair 
producers and processors than the spot market. A group of mohair producers 
marketing their mohair outside the spot marketing system as “Camdeboo” 
mohair and selling it directly to processors through systems of contracts and 
agreements has been a recent innovative development. This is a first attempt 
to make use of greater levels of coordination control to extract improved 
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